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Abstract 
Support for European integration among Turks has dropped from 67% in 2002 to 34% in 2008, 
with only 42% of Turks supporting enlargement in a 2011 Eurobarometer. As previous research 
on Turkish Euroskepticism has demonstrated, the opposition to Turkish enlargement within 
European states—the so-called ‘Turkoskepticism,’ as well as Turkish economic growth and 
identity-based concerns are likely reasons for this declining trend. In this study, we push these 
findings further to demonstrate the effects of Turkish foreign policy on EU support. Do the Turks 
find the EU more favorable as their concerns on Iran, political Islam, or the Syrian civil war 
increase? Using Pew Global Attitudes Project survey from 2013, we demonstrate that as Turks 
view their regional neighborhood increasingly volatile and threatening, they see the European 
Union as a more favorable actor. This effect is consistent across different model specifications, 
and illustrates that concerns over the international political context is just as important in 
explaining Turkish public attitudes toward the EU as some of the well-established utilitarian 
explanations of support.    
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TIME TO RECONSIDER? 
THE CHAOS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TURKISH SUPPORT FOR THE EU 
 
Introduction: 
Turkey’s weakening relations with the European Union and the decline in Turkish public support 
for the EU during the last decade can best be defined as a downward spiral. This trend has been 
complemented by the visible shift in Turkey’s foreign policy especially with the second Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) government toward the Middle East, reaching its zenith with the 
Arab Spring revolts. From 2011 onwards, Turkey became a far more assertive actor in the 
Middle East as exemplified first by its support for leadership change in Egypt and later by its 
vocal support against the Assad regime in Syria. Turkish activism, however, did not come 
without costs. The country’s assertive foreign policy in the region soon became antagonizing, 
thus shifting the rhetoric from “zero problems with neighbors” to Prime Minister Ahmet 
Davutoglu’s “valuable isolation.” Terrorist attacks in southern Turkey in the spring of 2013 
prompted the public and the opposition elites to criticize Turkey’s political involvement in the 
Syrian civil war, illustrating its dire domestic security consequences for Turkey. The more the 
country embedded itself within the Middle Eastern regional system, it seemed, the more it 
compromised its national security and complicated its relationship with the EU. 
Turkey's unusual path to full membership has taken many twists and turns, especially 
since the early 2000s, and this convoluted path has clearly affected public support for the EU 
within Turkey. One of the most dramatic episodes in Turkish-EU relations happened in 2004, 
when Cyprus was granted EU membership merely one week after they rejected the Annan Plan 
that proposed a reunification of the island under Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, 
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whereas Turkey was still waiting to become a candidate EU country. The shock of the 2004 
enlargement was soon replaced with enthusiasm when the EU agreed to begin accession 
negotiations with Turkey in December 2004, and opened six of the 35 chapters of the acquis in 
October 2005. But it was not long before the relations between Turkey and the EU began to sour. 
Turkey's refusal to open its ports to the vessels of Cyprus, now an EU member, resulted in the 
freezing of negotiations in December 2005 (Avci 2011).  
Between 2006 and 2011, Turkey also had to confront a series of domestic problems. 
These included the comeback of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) attacks in the southeast, the 
ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) clash with the Constitutional Court over their 
party's possible ban from politics, disclosure of coup plots to overthrow the government that led 
to the Ergenekon trials, and the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink that 
unleashed a myriad of discussions about the “deep-state,” as well as the rise of racism in Turkey. 
Avci (2011) explains that these problems halted the political reforms in Turkey, which led to the 
weakening of Turkish enthusiasm toward the EU. 
 Difficulties at home were complicated by relations with EU member states. In 2007, 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy vetoed the opening of the chapter on Economic and Monetary 
Union, perhaps the most central aspect of EU integration (Bilefsky 2007). Furthermore, the EU 
began to discuss the possibility of putting permanent safeguards on the mobility of Turkish labor 
once it was granted membership (Onis and Yilmaz 2009). The rise of Islamophobia, anti-
immigrationist views, and the electoral victories of far-Right politicians such as Jean-Marie Le 
Pen in France and Jorg Haider in Austria signaled that tough times were awaiting Turkey on its 
road to full membership.  
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 In this study, we ask whether it is time to reconsider Turkish public attitudes toward the 
European Union in light of the new security challenges specifically posed by the developments 
in Syria since the Arab Spring revolts of 2011. Given the rise of Turkish activism in the region 
and the environment of insecurity that the Syrian civil war has created, do Turks once again view 
the European Union favorably? 
 Using the 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, we answer this question by testing the 
well-established explanations in the literature regarding public support for the EU alongside our 
new explanations that capture the trade-off between regional security concerns and skepticism 
toward the European Union. Our analyses reveal that the previous generation of studies, which 
highlighted the effects of utility and identity-based factors on Turkish Euroskepticism, is no 
longer relevant. Instead, we find that Turkish public opinion toward the EU is increasingly 
shaped by the extent to which the citizens see their regional environment insecure and unstable. 
Our results suggest that as Turks voice greater concerns about the regional turmoil in the Middle 
East, they begin to view the European Union as a safe harbor, an alternative political actor. The 
results therefore suggest important implications not only for the Euroskepticism literature but for 
policy-makers as well. Given the chaos in Turkey’s southern neighborhood, it might be time to 
shift the focus of Turkish foreign policy towards Europe.  
 We proceed as follows. In the next two sections, we provide an overview of the 
Euroskepticism literature with a focus on utilitarian and identity-based explanations, and then 
introduce a discussion of Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East in the context of the Arab 
Spring revolts. We present our hypotheses in these sections before we move on to describe our 
data and variable specifications in part four. Next, we present our findings. We conclude with an 
overview of our results and suggest some avenues for future research.   
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Explaining Turkish Public Opinion towards the European Union: 
Given the European Union's historical significance as a regional economic powerhouse, focusing 
on the economic advantages and disadvantages of the EU has been an indispensible part of those 
studies that explain public support for European Union. Two variants of this utilitarian 
explanation predominate the literature. First, egocentric explanations use objective measures of 
individual economic well-being such as age, level of education, and occupation group of 
respondents. Tucker and his co-authors (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Herzog and Tucker 
2009), for instance, adopt an egocentric approach to argue that winners and losers of integration 
will vary in their support for the EU. They suggest that winners of integration will support the 
EU, whereas those who face economic loss following integration will be more Euroskeptical, 
with individual-skill level acting as another crucial variable (Gabel 1998a, b). This literature has 
also suggested that education-level can proxy skill-level (Gabel 1998b, McLaren 2002), where 
respondents with higher levels of education show stronger support for the European Union. 
 The literature on Turkish Euroskepticism has also tested the power of egocentric 
economic explanations (Kentmen 2008, Carkoglu and Kentmen 2011, Yilmaz 2011). 
Specifically, Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011) have illustrated that perceived personal economic 
benefits of the European Union positively influence public attitudes toward the European Union.  
 The Pew Global Attitudes Survey does not ask questions to capture the occupation 
groups of the respondents. However, the survey does ask questions to measure the extent to 
which the respondents are optimistic about their individual economic well-being within the 
context of their national economy. Building on the preceding discussion of personal economic 
well-being, we therefore generate two hypotheses. First, we argue that respondents with high 
levels of education should have more favorable attitudes toward the European Union (Hypothesis 
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1). In other words, those who can transport their skill-sets elsewhere in the high-skilled European 
workforce should see the European Union more favorably. Second, we expect that respondents 
who perceive their individual economic well-being positively should have more favorable views 
towards the European Union (Hypothesis 2). 
 The second strand of utilitarian explanations focuses on the evaluations of the national 
economy, otherwise known as the sociotropic explanations of EU support. Indeed, sociotropic 
explanations of support for integration have been investigated extensively in the literature on 
Western Europe (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005), as well as 
specifically in the context of Turkish Euroskepticism (Kentmen 2008; Carkoglu and Kentmen 
2011). However, these studies tend to explain support for integration by looking at the extent to 
which EU membership will improve their home economies. In this study we move beyond this 
hypothesis to ask whether Turkish respondents' view of the national economy affects their 
favorability ratings for the EU regardless of what they might think about the potential economic 
advantages or disadvantages membership may bring. Sociotropic optimists, or people who think 
the Turkish economy is improving, have little to fear from European Union membership; further, 
they may view the chance to join Europe as boosting the economy even more. As part of our 
utilitarian explanations, we test whether positive evaluations of the national economy increase 
the public favorability of the European Union (Hypothesis 3). 
 In addition to utilitarian explanations, the literature on public support for the EU has 
emphasized the role of cultural factors. For example, McLaren (2002) argues that individual 
subjective perceptions that the EU threatens the culture of a country are critical in shaping 
attitudes. As such, individuals who see the EU as a threat to their national culture—however 
defined—should be less sympathetic towards it.  
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 Specifically in the context of Turkish public opinion, cultural factors have received 
significant attention, especially with how enlargement has been politicized in the EU based on 
the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU, of which religion is the most apparent. 
Kentmen (2008) and Yilmaz (2011) argue that the role of religion is important in shaping 
Turkish attitudes toward the EU. Their empirical results have been contradictory, however. On 
the one hand, Kentmen’s (2008) analysis shows that attachment to Islam does not have a 
significant influence on Turkish support for EU membership. On the other, Yilmaz (2011) finds 
that those who identify themselves as “barely religious” are among the top three non-Euroskeptic 
groups in Turkey, following pro-Kurdish voters and those with a high-level of knowledge about 
the European Union.  
 The religious composition of the Turkish society, coupled with the growing Islamic-
conservative tendencies of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) increasingly 
highlights the cultural differences between Turkey and the European Union. The culture 
hypothesis expects that these differences should translate into attitudes on foreign policy 
including attitudes toward the European Union. Most recently, Ciftci (2013) has surveyed 
university students in Turkey to find that respondents with a religious attachment “are more 
likely to support the AKP’s increased foreign policy involvement in the Middle East” (p. 39). 
However, the author has also argued that this does not necessarily lead to their lack of support 
for the EU. “The results also show,” Ciftci (2013: 39) contends, “that respondents holding the 
same religious identity may be supportive of active foreign policy in the EU.” Overall, there are 
ample theoretical reasons and empirical ambiguity to study the effects of religion on Turkish 
attitudes toward the European Union. Following this literature, we expect that respondents for 
whom religion has an important role in their lives should be more sensitive to the cultural 
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difference between the European Union and Turkey, and therefore have less favorable opinions 
toward the EU (Hypothesis 4). 
 The aforementioned theoretical perspectives on public support for the EU are well-
established in the literature. What we introduce next concerns the role of foreign policy and 
regional politics on EU support—a theoretical perspective that, despite the more recent sine-
wave of developments in Turkey’s foreign and regional policies, has been so far understudied.  
 
Turkish Foreign Policy Activism and the Chaos in the Middle East:  
In addition to Turkey's growing economic strength in the region, especially vis-à-vis the 
economic fragility of several South European EU member states in the recent past, studies have 
also emphasized the new activism and multi-directionality of Turkish foreign policy (Muftuler-
Bac 2011; Onis and Yilmaz 2009; Aras and Fidan 2009; Altunisik and Martin 2011). Turkey’s 
Prime Minister and formerly the minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu has stated several 
years ago that “Turkey's multi-dimensional foreign policy has been firmly established for the 
past 45 years, and has been largely successful” (Davutoglu 2008).  
 Studies on Turkish foreign policy have used qualitative evidence to show that 
Turkish foreign policy began to shift towards what Onis and Yilmaz (2009, 13) call “soft Euro-
Asianism,” which entails “foreign policy activism pursued with respect to all neighboring 
regions but with no firm-EU axis as was previously the case.” Indeed, over the last several years 
Turkey has become a significant actor in its neighborhood. Relations with Iraq took a turn away 
from conflict towards cooperation through the use of economic incentives: as of 2011, Turkey 
has become the largest trading partner of Iraq (Muftuler-Bac 2011). As Davutoglu (2008) 
explains in detail, Turkey has also become a mediator between Afghanistan and Pakistan; in Iraq 
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and Lebanon to help amend the sectarian disputes in these countries; and invited Iranian and 
European officials to Istanbul to create an opportunity for dialogue to discuss Iran's nuclear 
activities. Turkey's activism in the Israel-Palestine conflict and President Erdogan’s vociferous 
advocacy for Palestine (especially Gaza) at the international level is also worth noting. 
 It was the Arab Spring, however, that clearly marked the high point of Turkey’s foreign 
policy activism in the Middle East. Henri Barkey (2012) defines the period that began with the 
2011 revolts as “The Would-be Regional Hegemon.” Specifically, Barkey (2012) has argued that 
Turkey’s “conciliatory” and “balancing” role in the region gave way to a far more assertive role 
in this period that is further justified by the international community’s portrayal of this country 
as the “model state” for countries such as Egypt (Telhami 2012), which were taken by massive 
revolts toward regime change. Since 2011, Turkey has become a vociferous supporter of the new 
government following the departure of Mubarak, and albeit slowly, aligned with other NATO 
countries in responding to the revolts in Libya. 
 Turkish activism in the post-Arab Spring environment, however, came with significant 
political costs. Most notably, the relations with the Assad regime in Syria—which were mended 
only relatively recently during the early AKP years—soured at an unsettling pace during the 
leadership of the same political actors across both sides of the border, eventually leading to a 
matter of national security for Turkey. As Turkey began to give outright political support to the 
Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime and therefore publicly took sides in the civil war, 
scholars have contended that the country “appears to have been drawn into the perennial 
sectarian conflicts such as the Sunni-Shi’a rivalry” (Onis 2014: 205).  
 Indeed, Onis (2014: 211) argues that “the result of this over-activism [in Syria] has been 
to bring growing security risks for Turkey on its southern border.” He gives the example of the 
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Reyhanli attack that killed more than 50 civilians in the city of Hatay in southern Turkey in May 
2013. The attack took place mere kilometers away from the Syrian border in a town that is 
“home to thousands of Syrian refugees in a gathering point for rebels fighting to topple President 
al-Assad,” thus heightening “the fears that the Syrian conflict had moved to Turkey” (Onis 2014: 
215). It is especially remarkable that the attacks happened in May 2013, only two months after 
the Pew Global Attitudes survey was administered in Turkey, where respondents were asked—
for the first time by Pew—whether they were concerned about the war spreading to Turkey. 
Clearly, the post-Arab Spring created greater room for Turkish activism in the Middle East and 
presented several economic and political opportunities that facilitated power projection, but 
perhaps more importantly, the country’s assertive foreign policy behavior in the region incurred 
significant risks for domestic political stability let alone limiting the country’s room for 
maneuver in the region.  
 How do the developments in the region, particularly pertaining to Turkey’s involvement 
in the Syrian conflict, influence Turkish attitudes toward the European Union? Recently, a new 
wave of studies has begun to suggest that as volatility increases in Turkey’s southern 
neighborhood, it should give the incentive for Turkey to switch gears and shift its foreign policy 
axis towards the West, namely the European Union. For example, the Istanbul-based think-tank, 
Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, has released a report based on a nationally 
conducted survey earlier in 2015, whose results show that almost 23 percent of the respondents 
believe Turkey should cooperate with the European Union “to have a stronger economy and 
foreign policy.” Next come the “Arab States,” though only 11 percent of the respondents believe 
that Turkey should focus on these actors to strengthen its foreign policy (EDAM 2015).  
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 The results are indicative of a change of heart among the Turkish public. Support for 
European integration among Turks has dropped from 67% in 2002 to 34% in 2008, with only 
42% of Turks supporting enlargement in a 2011 Eurobarometer. As previous research on Turkish 
Euroskepticism has demonstrated, the opposition to Turkish enlargement within European 
states—the so-called ‘Turkoskepticism,’ as well as Turkish economic growth and identity-based 
concerns are likely reasons for this declining trend (Canan-Sokullu 2011, Kentmen 2008, 
Carkoglu and Kentmen 2011). However, we argue that the instability in the country’s southern 
neighborhood should reverse this trend, at least among concerned citizens. Turkey’s proactive 
foreign policy in the Middle East is in decline, most visibly with respect to its fast-deteriorating 
relations with the regime in Syria. We expect that the domestic security concerns created by the 
Syrian civil war should alert the Turkish public and stimulate positive attitudes toward the EU. 
Put differently, we hypothesize that as Turkish citizens voice serious concerns about the security 
implications of the Syrian civil war, they should view the EU more favorably (Hypothesis 5).
1
  
 
Data and Methods: 
We use the 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Survey to test our expectations. The Pew surveys, 
administered annually, collect individual-level opinion data on a number of economic and 
political issues ranging from perceptions of national and individual economic well-being to 
support for democracy, Islamic extremism, to attitudes on other cultures.  
 The 2013 iteration of the survey spans 40 countries across the world, including Turkey. 
For its Turkey component, Pew Global conducted face-to-face interviews in March 2013 with 
                                                 
1
 We would like to point out that the theoretical discussion presented here is by no means an exhaustive attempt to 
outline Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East or the regional security challenges (such as Hezbollah, Islamic 
extremism, Iranian nuclear program or Al Qaeda terrorism) that the country faces. In future drafts, we would like to 
discuss Turkey’s relationships with Iran and the challenges posed by this country as well as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda 
to better situate why Turkish public opinion has reasons to develop favorable opinions toward the European Union.  
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1000 respondents aged 18 and older across the seven administrative regions, resulting in a 
sample that represents the adult population (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2013). Previous 
studies in the literature utilizing the Pew surveys emphasize their “consistency with other 
empirical data,” most importantly with “surveys performed by the Turkish polling organizations” 
(Kennedy and Dickenson 2013). These insights provide us with greater confidence to use the 
Global Attitudes Survey for an analysis of Turkish public opinion towards the European Union.  
 The dependent variable for the study is EU attitude. This variable is based on the 
question “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the European Union?”, where 1 is “very favorable,” 
2 “somewhat favorable,” 3 “somewhat unfavorable” and 4 denotes “very unfavorable” attitudes. 
For ease of interpretation, the values are reversed, so that 4 captures “very favorable” and 1 
captures “very unfavorable” attitudes, and so on.   
 Following the literature on the effects of sociotropic and egocentric evaluations of the 
domestic economy on EU attitudes, we include two variables, Sociotropic and Egocentric. The 
Pew survey asks two questions to capture sociotropic and egocentric evaluations, respectively: 
“Now thinking about our economic situation, how would you describe the current economic 
situation in Turkey – is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?” and “Now 
thinking about your personal economic situation, how would you describe it – is it very good, 
somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?” The answer categories for each question range 
from 1 (very good) to 4 (very bad). Following the procedure for EU attitudes, the values are 
reversed so that 1 denotes very bad and 4 denotes very good, and so on.  
 To test the effects of domestic and foreign policy concerns on attitudes toward the 
European Union we utilize a number of independent variables. First and foremost, we use the 
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question asking respondents their concerns regarding the Syrian civil war: “And thinking 
specifically about our country, to what extent are you concerned that the violence in Syria will 
spread to Turkey – very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned or not at all 
concerned?” We flip the answer categories so that 1 denotes “not at all concerned” and 4 denotes 
“very concerned.”   
 The other key independent variables capture the respondents’ attitudes toward a number 
of regional political actors and issues. These variables include Islamic extremism (1- not at all 
concerned, 4-very concerned) as well as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda (1- very unfavorable, 4- very 
favorable). Finally, we include a variable measuring the Turkish attitudes on the Iranian nuclear 
program, where the answer categories range from 1 (not at all concerned) to 4 (very concerned).  
 Finally, we include in our models a series of control variables to account for demographic 
factors. Following the literature on Europskepticism, we test the effects of age, gender and 
religiosity on attitudes toward the EU. We also develop three dummy variables for education, 
where low education includes respondents with up to eight years of primary education, low-mid 
education includes respondents who completed junior high or high school, or their vocational 
equivalents, and high education includes respondents with a university degree or higher. These 
categories correspond to the variables utilized in previous literature (Brinegar and Jolly 2005, 
Kentmen 2008).  
 We include Southeastern Turkey as a final control variable capturing the respondent’s 
region of residence. While about 10 percent of respondents are from the southeastern region of 
Turkey, we expect that they will be particularly concerned regarding the Syrian civil war and 
therefore will have a significant effect on EU favorability.  
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 For all of the above variables, respondents who refused to answer the questions or stated 
that they did not know were coded missing.  
 To estimate our models, we use ordinal logistic regression. This is a suitable choice given 
the categorical nature of our dependent variable, EU attitudes. In the next section, we present the 
results of these analyses.  
 
Results: 
Table 1 below presents our results, reporting the ordered log-odds regression coefficients. We 
begin with a basic model, Model 1, which tests the effects of key explanatory variables of EU 
support with the low education category as its baseline. The results of this model show that older 
respondents see the European Union significantly less favorable an actor at the international 
level. This finding not only corroborates the findings of the existing literature but also our own 
previous work that has studied Turkish mass support for EU membership across 2001 and 2010 
(Jolly and Oktay 2012). Model 1 also shows that respondents with a university degree or higher 
are significantly more supportive of the European Union compared to those with fewer years of 
education.  
 Surprisingly, Model 1 suggests that neither individual-level nor national-level evaluations 
of the domestic economy have significant effects on Turkish attitudes toward the EU. Put 
differently, Turkish respondents do not evaluate the European Union by looking at its economic 
utility. This finding marks an important departure from the previous sets of results reported in the 
literature. Kentmen (2008) and Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011) among others have investigated 
the sociotropic explanations of support (for EU integration) across time and multiple survey 
datasets to find that national and individual evaluations of the economy have significant positive 
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influence on support for EU membership among the Turkish public. By 2013, however, we find 
that assessments of the national economy have no effect on the extent to which the EU is 
perceived as a favorable actor.  
 This is an especially meaningful result in light of the positive developments in the 
Turkish economy since 2002. Turkey has maintained an average growth rate of almost 7 percent 
between 2002 and 2007, whereas during the same period the average growth rate for the EU-25 
was 2.3 percent (Eurostat). Even though the trend in Turkish economic growth began to decline 
in the run up to the 2009 global economic crisis, the country was able to maneuver its way out of 
the crisis without major damages. Economic growth rate dipped to a dismal -9.8 percent in 
2009, though the next year it jumped back to 10 percent, making Turkey one of the fastest 
growing economies along with China. Turkey is now the 16th biggest economy in the world 
(Muftuler-Bac 2011). 
 Turkey's economic growth is also indicated by increasing levels of foreign trade. Data 
show that the amount of total exports more than quadrupled between 2001 and 2011, and an 
average of 67 percent of all exports during this period were sent to the European Union (Turkish 
Statistical Institute). Clearly, Turkey's economic competitiveness in the global markets has 
increased over time, and Turkish goods found significant market opportunities in the European 
Union. Although this is facilitated by Turkey's Customs Union agreement, it is plausible to argue 
that the country's market competitiveness in the EU and the overall upward trend in economic 
outlook has led the public to evaluate the European Union without anchoring their opinion to an 
economic calculus.  
 Next, we include our key policy variables in Model 2, while keeping low education as the 
baseline category. As we hypothesized, concerns about the Syrian war have a significant positive 
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effect on favorability of the EU. Specifically, the likelihood of having favorable attitudes toward 
the EU increases as respondents are more concerned about the possibility of Syrian civil war 
spreading to Turkey. This finding suggests important implications for Turkish foreign policy as 
well as the role of the European Union for Turkish public. Clearly, Turkish respondents see the 
European Union as an anchor—a balancing anchor—when regional stability is disturbed. 
Turkish proactive foreign policy towards the Middle East in recent years has received growing 
public support especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, leading to a concurrent loss of 
public as well as elite interest in the country’s bid for European Union membership.  
 The results of our analysis suggest that this dynamic is now being challenged with the 
turmoil in the country’s immediate neighborhood. The Syrian civil war continues to destabilize 
the region and threatens domestic stability along Turkey’s southern border. In response to the 
souring environment in the Middle East, Turks increasingly see the European Union as a 
favorable actor. Most interestingly, this effect holds while the demographic and economic 
variables from Model 1 are still accounted for. On the other hand, attitudes toward Al Qaeda or 
the Iranian nuclear program have no significant effect on attitudes toward the European Union. 
The threats posed by these regional actors and issues clearly pale in comparison to the severity of 
the concerns generated by the Syrian civil war. 
 Last, we build on Model 2 and include the interaction effect, Syrian civil war * 
Southeastern Turkey. We hypothesized earlier that the EU’s favorability ratings should vary 
across regions, especially with regards to those living in the southeastern region of Turkey where 
the Syrian civil war poses the most immediate security threats. We expected that respondents 
living in the southeast should amplify the effect of the concerns regarding the Syrian civil war on 
the favorability of the European Union. The interaction term in Model 3 shows, however, that 
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while the intensity of concerns over the Syrian civil war continues to increase the favorability of 
the EU among Turkish respondents, whether or not the respondents come from this specific part 
of the country does not moderate or amplify the effect of these concerns on attitudes toward the 
European Union.  
 
  
17 
 
Table 1. Turkish Attitudes toward the European Union 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
    
Age -0.022
***
 -0.018
**
 -0.018
**
 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Low-mid education 0.287 0.421
*
 0.429
*
 
 (0.169) (0.199) (0.199) 
High education 0.827
***
 0.954
***
 0.965
***
 
 (0.218) (0.252) (0.252) 
Female 0.068 -0.072 -0.064 
 (0.135) (0.158) (0.159) 
Sociotropic economic evaluations -0.004 0.007 0.007 
 (0.089) (0.104) (0.104) 
Egocentric economic evaluations 0.105 0.185 0.181 
 (0.093) (0.111) (0.111) 
Religiosity 0.046 -0.051 -0.043 
 (0.109) (0.133) (0.134) 
Syrian civil war  0.237
**
 0.276
**
 
  (0.085) (0.089) 
Al Qaeda  0.153 0.140 
  (0.107) (0.107) 
Iranian nuclear program  -0.037 -0.045 
  (0.202) (0.202) 
Southeastern Turkey  -0.034 1.384 
  (0.313) (0.951) 
Syrian civil war*Southeastern Turkey   -0.461 
   (0.294) 
cut1    
_cons -0.353 0.518 0.647 
 (0.524) (0.672) (0.678) 
cut2    
_cons 0.747 1.704
*
 1.839
**
 
 (0.525) (0.676) (0.683) 
cut3    
_cons 2.850
***
 3.777
***
 3.912
***
 
 (0.542) (0.695) (0.702) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.0327 0.0453 0.047 
N 782 609 609 
 Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 DV: Attitudes toward the European Union 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Conclusion: 
Turkey’s relationship with the European Union has historically been dramatic, embedded in ebbs 
and flows of relative economic conditions as well as mutual perceptions of differences and 
doubts. Even though the AKP had made great strides in pushing the accession process forward, 
they were soon outweighed as a result of a remarkable shift in foreign policy away from Europe 
and towards the Middle East. The public opinion in Turkey by and large echoed the change in 
government policy. EU favorability has decreased significantly over time, reaching a new low by 
2011.  
 The glory days of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, however, where the country 
was once portrayed as the model state for countries such as Egypt (Telhami 2012) were rather 
short-lived. The tides reversed specifically with respect to Turkey’s relationship the Assad 
regime in Syria when Turkey chose to give support to the rebel fighters. Further political 
involvement in the war translated into regional insecurity and instability, raising public concerns 
in Turkey over whether the country could be eventually pulled into the Syrian unrest.  
 In this increasingly volatile regional context, we have argued that it is time to reconsider 
the role of the European Union in Turkish politics, specifically with a focus on the change in 
Turkish public attitudes. We have posited that given the regional instability in its southern 
neighborhood, Turks should begin to see the EU as a more favorable actor. Our analyses have 
illustrated that this is indeed the case: while the younger population and highly educated 
respondents continue to view the European Union favorably, thus echoing previous analyses, we 
have demonstrated that the concern over the possibility that the Syrian civil war could spread to 
Turkey is the key predictor of Turkish favorability towards the European Union.  
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 This marks a notable departure from the literature on Euroskepticism. Our finding shows 
that it is time we move beyond utilitarian and identity-based explanations of support for the EU 
to better understand Turkish Euroskepticism. Public attitudes toward the EU are shaped by a 
myriad of factors including perceived economic benefit and culture, but these are by no means 
exhaustive explanations of support. The international political context is just as important as 
these well-established explanations—and in the Turkish case presented here, it seems that the 
international context is key to understanding why Turks begin to perceive the EU as a valuable 
actor to have on their side. This is also an important insight for policymaking as it illustrates that 
Turkish public opinion provides both European and Turkish policymakers with the opportunity 
to thaw relations.  
 Areas of improvement still remain. Most importantly, the analysis we provide here only 
highlights the regional political situation in 2013, while the historical context we discuss easily 
dates back to 2010, when Turkey began to become more vocal in its Middle Eastern 
neighborhood. The next step for our project is therefore to develop a temporal analysis of public 
opinion towards the European Union while taking into account the variation in public attitudes 
toward the regional context. Furthermore, incorporating political and economic variables 
measuring the foreign policy orientations of the Turkish government as well as the national 
economic environment should enable a more rigorous study of contextual effects alongside the 
individual-level explanations of support for the European Union.  
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